The 31st United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP31) begins in Antalya, Türkiye, on November 9 with a persistent gap between promised #ClimateFinance and what is actually delivered. Two questions will decide whether #COP31 succeeds: who funds the transition, and will trade rules help or hinder the flow of money to those who need it most? #ClimateAction rests on three pillars: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Under the Paris Agreement and in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, developed countries are obliged to finance all three in developing countries.

At COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, developed countries agreed to take the lead in mobilising at least $300 billion a year by 2035; developing countries had asked for $13 trillion. At COP30 in Belém, the “Baku-to-Belém Roadmap” for reaching $1.3 trillion was merely “taken note of”, with no binding milestones. Most developed countries have yet to announce new pledges. Multilateral development banks provided a record $103 billion in 2025, but mostly as loans, adding to heavy debt burdens. The Bonn talks in June failed to even set up the climate finance work programme agreed upon in Brazil. The hardest fight, over what developed countries now owe, lands squarely in Antalya.

For frontline countries, adaptation is where the gap is felt the most. COP30 agreed to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, five years later than many had wanted, while leaving open questions of both the baseline and about who pays. Developing countries need $310 billion to $365 billion a year to adapt, yet only $26 billion was available in 2023. Even where finance exists, access is a severe hurdle, as Pacific leaders stressed at the pre-COP in Fiji.

Loss and damage are the least-funded pillar of all. The Fund for Responding to #LossAndDamage holds only $250 million in its start-up phase, and replenishment is not due until 2027. But communities are losing homes, land, and livelihoods now. Bangladesh has more at stake than most, and our eventual graduation from the Least Developed Country (LDC) category could also reduce our access to concessional support. Graduation reflects income, but eligibility for climate finance should be based on risk, not income.

While finance remains the primary battleground, a much larger front has opened in trade. The flashpoint is the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which began pricing embedded carbon in imports in January. The G77 and China oppose such unilateral measures, warning that a levy collected at Europe’s border could move money from South to North. That concern is legitimate, but #CBAM can also work in our favour. By putting a price on carbon at the border, CBAM rewards producers who decarbonise early.

Exporters that invest in renewable power, efficiency, and credible emissions data can turn it from a cost into a competitive edge and a source for green investment. It also spurs the emissions-tracking systems that unlock carbon markets and climate finance.

Trade can cut the finance bill in two further ways. First, lower tariffs on solar panels, batteries, and grid components reduce what a project must borrow. The second is the cost of borrowing itself. Clean energy costs are almost entirely upfront, so interest rates decide whether a project is viable, and developing countries could end up paying more to borrow than rich ones. Steady hard-currency earnings from green exports cut currency risk and the cost of capital. We must be clear about the limits. Trade gains mostly help revenue-earning mitigation, not embankments or disaster recovery, which still need grants. Nor should they ever be counted against developed countries’ finance obligations.

For Bangladesh, the trade question is immediate. LDC graduation is scheduled for November 24 this year, or in 2029 if a pending deferral request is approved. It starts the clock on duty-free access to the EU, which bought an estimated 19.4 billion euros of our apparel in 2025. Three years after graduation, most garments will face tariffs of around 9.6 percent unless Dhaka secures GSP+ status or a trade agreement. CBAM does not yet cover garments, but its logic is already spreading through European buyers’ demand for low-carbon supply chains. Moving early on cleaner power and verified green factories would protect the export earnings that underpin our credit standing and make Bangladesh a preferred low-carbon sourcing destination.

Bangladesh should therefore push for three priorities. First, affordable clean technology through lower barriers to clean equipment, so that we have less to borrow. Second, future trade terms, including GSP+, that recognise verified green production. Third, a share of CBAM revenue channelled to help exporters decarbonise, so that border measures support countries rather than penalise them just as they lose LDC status.

Ultimately, for COP31 to deliver, a move from pledges to delivery is essential. This requires, firstly, an agreement on the scope of the climate finance work programme. Then comes a delivery path for tripling adaptation finance, a credible replenishment plan for the loss and damage fund, and a just transition mechanism with money attached. On trade, lower clean-tech tariffs and recycled border revenue can turn CBAM from a grievance into a lever for cheaper finance and faster transition. South Asia also needs a coordinated voice on finance and trade, given our shared vulnerabilities. We can no longer rely on promises. For LDCs and other frontline countries, as their leaders made clear in Fiji, COP31 will be judged not by what is promised, but by what arrives.

By Palash Kanti Das, Senior advisor at Climate Action Network South Asia (CANSA) and managing partner at Lexington Advisory Group